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 A market-based mechanism to
improve capital expenditures
Most governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have a capital
spending problem. They don’t spend enough money to build or
improve infrastructure that is in obviously short supply. What
has emerged as a ‘second-best’ solution to this problem is
infrastructure-directed lending by the development agencies.
This is an unfortunate solution, not just for the weakness in
state capacity that it perpetuates, and the fiscal space it frees up
for countries to undertake expensive commercial borrowing,
but also because it links unnecessary debt to necessary
infrastructure. I propose a private sector-based solution that
links infrastructure spending to contemporaneous revenues, in
which the useful functions of the development agency are
opened up to competition and the debt financing is replaced by
markets for political risk. This solution could not only reduce
the cost and debt burden of building infrastructure, but also
create high-powered incentives that would solve the weaknesses
in state capacity that made debt-linked infrastructure necessary
in the first place.
The capital spending problem
Consider the case of Ghana, chosen for being a beacon of
democracy and high state capacity. According to the latest IMF
figures, Ghana’s 2012 budget came out to around 25% of GDP,
of which 6.8 percentage points went to capital expenditures.
Over half of the capital expenditures were foreign-financed, to
the tune of GHc 2.5 billion or around US$1.4 billion. World
Bank disbursements, meanwhile, were $343 million in 2012,
while African Development Bank loans were also in the
hundreds of millions. A typical project is the World Bank’s
Transport Sector Project, approved in 2009 for $225 million,
which is mostly a concessional loan to improve trunk roads,
urban roads, and urban infrastructure. The loan also covers
feasibility studies and project management, as well as minor
support to an alphabet soup of transportation-related
organisations in Ghana. (Similar projects funded by the African
Development Bank financed specific sections of roads in
Northern Ghana as well as greater Accra.) Why would the
Ghanaian government need a 6-year $225 million loan from the
World Bank, when its growth in government revenue from
2011 to 2012 was over $1.4 billion?
The easy answer is that the loan is highly concessional, so offers
financing at a cheaper cost than the government’s discount rate
(and indeed cheaper than the rate of inflation), and the
government would be foolish not to take it. This of course is
correct, but begs the question: why not separate out the
subsidised component of the loan and call it a grant, then let the
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subsidised component of the loan and call it a grant, then let the
government do its own road construction? Ignoring the politics
of World Bank lending, which are partly to blame, I argue that
the loan is not just an infusion of revenue, but rather a project-
finance product with at least three separate functions: (1)
financing, (2) project development, procurement and
monitoring functions, as well as (3) the commitment to honour
the multi-year expenditure path to complete the relevant
infrastructure. In short, by signing up to a loan like this (or
similar ones from other development finance institutions), the
Ghanaian government commits itself to building a relatively
simple piece of infrastructure, but one that requires a feasibility
study, project management, and several years of financial
outlays.
This example is not meant to single out Ghana, which in many
ways is a model of African development. We could look closely
at any number of sub-Saharan countries, in particular the
resource-rich ones, and see a similar story of foreign-financed
basic infrastructure combined with a growing national budget
with a very small envelope dedicated to capital expenditure.
Do African governments need the money?
Despite growing its revenues by $1.4 billion, Ghana faced a
$4.4 billion shortfall in 2012, with expenditure growth led by
employee compensation (IMF 2013a). Other new resource
exporters face a similar dynamic. In Tanzania, despite 6% real
GDP growth and an increase in revenue to GDP, the
government ran a pre-grant budget deficit of almost 9% of
GDP, meanwhile financing the majority of its development
budget through foreign loans (IMF 2012). Mozambique looks
almost identical (IMF 2013b). The growth records and low
rates on concessional financing give these countries the credit
profile to float debt at commercial rates, which they are all
doing. Ghana recently had to pay 8% on a dollar-denominated
loan [1] and Mozambique 8.5%. [2]
This indicates that the ‘fungibility’ critique is at play here: the
development banks’ cheap loans are merely allowing the
government to borrow at expensive rates. A 2008 African
Development Bank study found that governments face
challenges in budget execution as well as multiple opportunities
for reallocation. This means that capital expenditures, which
require an extensive amount of things to go right before
allocated funds can be dispensed, can easily be reallocated to
current expenditure uses, which often require simply issuing the
funds. Governments are left with a dual problem, despite their
strong underlying fiscal potential: a high cost of financing, and
the marginal dollar being spent on current expenditure. The
challenge of undertaking multi-year infrastructure projects is
left to the development banks. That the development banks
continue to deliver these projects saves the governments from
crises of legitimacy that could otherwise get them thrown out of
office.
Untying the loan-infrastructure relationship
African governments have the opportunity to free themselves
from the loan-infrastructure relationship while also protecting
their budgets from being squandered on unnecessary current
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their budgets from being squandered on unnecessary current
expenditures. The first step is to separate out the lending
function from the other functions of infrastructure loans
(project development/management and offering a commitment
mechanism to finance a multi-year expenditure project) and to
create a mechanism that directs new revenue toward these
projects. The insight behind this proposal is that a loan is
simply a commitment mechanism to pay for a multi-year
project – but an expensive one if the true cost of capital is 8%,
and a disingenuous one in the case of concessional loans if the
risk of default is borne by taxpayers in developed companies
who will finance another round of debt relief before the loans
are paid back.
Rather than have a development bank structure an
infrastructure project as a loan for a defined, managed
infrastructure project with a repayment schedule, an investment
or development bank could simply undertake the project
development and management functions and then set up a more
efficient commitment mechanism to fund the project itself.
Consider the $225 million loan to Ghana to build some roads
over six years. Rather than receive disbursements in, say, six
annual tranches to then repay it over 40 years, Ghana could
simply pay directly in six tranches – easily financed by the
country’s rapid growth and gains in revenue mobilisation. But if
the project is to be implemented by a private construction firm,
getting the government’s word may not be enough. In order to
protect those expenditures from being reallocated in the
budgeting process – particularly for much larger projects –
something else is needed.
The commitment mechanism proposed is to issue political risk
insurance alongside the spending commitment schedule for the
project. The government would have to take out insurance
against its own risk of default. If the government failed to pay
the $35 million required in year five, for example, the insurance
issuer would foot the bill and the contract with the construction
firm would still be honoured. At first glance, this seems like
moral hazard, giving the government the incentive to default on
its obligation since the cost would be borne by the insurer. But
on closer scrutiny, it is the opposite: the more the government
honors its obligations, the cheaper it is to insure projects in the
future. Sovereign debt works in exactly the same fashion.
Political risk insurance is inherently cheaper than a straight-up
loan, since a loan has to cover the investor’s cost of capital as
well as the political risk of default. Since underperformance
would affect the cost of future risk insurance, it would also
provide an incentive to the government to get its public finances
in order, something a concessional loan doesn’t do. And by
committing itself to a multi-year contract intermediated by an
investment bank, the government could ensure that its capital
budget gets spent before it gets reallocated to current
expenditures which, like a ratchet, are hard to retract once they
have been increased. This commitment is a bigger advantage for
most governments than the financial restrictions of reduced
cashflow. As a bonus, separating out the project development
and management from the loan itself would inject competition
into the market to create complex infrastructure, freeing
developing countries from their dependence on the development
finance institutions.
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finance institutions.
One could imagine a spectrum of different arrangements. For
countries where the budgeting process is particularly
unconducive to multi-year capital projects, some revenue
sources (such as royalties on natural resource activity) could be
first routed through an overseas custodian account from which
the contract would be honored. This is not unlike the US
bailout of Mexico during the 1994 Tequila crisis, in which
Mexico had to put up its oil production revenues as collateral.
[3] Such an arrangement would no doubt decrease the cost of
the political risk insurance, and hence of project development.
Larger countries with bigger projects could attempt to securitise
the risk insurance rather than paying an insurer directly. An
investment bank could issue instruments similar to credit
default swaps in which the credit event being scrutinised would
be the government’s honouring its contract with the
infrastructure firm. As part of the arrangement, the government
would have to buy these ‘contract default swaps’ (CDS) for the
firm. If the government defaulted on its obligation to the
construction company, the sellers of the CDS would make a
payment to honour the contract. (The sellers’ claim in this case
might be the right to collect via a dispute settlement process
mediated through ICSID, rather than through bankruptcy
procedure as with a normal CDS.) The spread on the CDS
would be the cost of the insurance. The advantage of this
structure over a direct payment to a risk insurer is that the
investment bank could allow ‘naked’ CDSs (bought and sold by
those unrelated to the original buyer and seller of the insurance)
to trade in a transparent exchange, and in so doing provide a
barometer to the government and its constituents of the
perceived likelihood of default. Being able to lower its spread
would be an incentive to good governments to showcase their
competence while decreasing their cost of capital spending
towards the risk-free rate.
Towards a world of better, cheaper capital spending
This article has argued that the capital spending problem for
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is that they don’t do
enough of it. In spite of an often advantageous fiscal situation,
potentially transformational spending on infrastructure gets left
out as budgets inefficiently allocate capital and trend towards
large and barely-sustainable deficits. In this context, lending
becomes the easy way to get real infrastructure built, since it
comes with built-in project development and management
functions, as well as a commitment mechanism to pay the
construction company. But these functions can be separated and
opened up to competition if lending itself is substituted for
political risk insurance covering default risk for the firms
building the infrastructure. In the process, this would lower the
cost of capital spending for developing countries, improve the
market for project origination and management, and generate
incentives for governments to better manage their public
expenditures.
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Notes
[1] See http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/25/ghana-
overseas-bond-sale-receives-modest-response/
[2] See http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21590594-story-dollar-bond-issue-mozambique-
parable-easy-money-fishy
[3] See http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/16/business/mexico-
repays-bailout-by-us-ahead-of-time.html?
pagewanted=all&src=pm
